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Abstract. Monitorability delineates what properties can be verified at
runtime. Although many monitorability definitions exist, few are defined
explicitly in terms of the guarantees provided by monitors, i.e., the com-
putational entities carrying out the verification. We view monitorability
as a spectrum: the fewer monitor guarantees that are required, the more
properties become monitorable. We present a monitorability hierarchy
and provide operational and syntactic characterisations for its levels.
Existing monitorability definitions are mapped into our hierarchy, pro-
viding a unified framework that makes the operational assumptions and
guarantees of each definition explicit. This provides a rigorous founda-
tion that can inform design choices and correctness claims for runtime
verification tools.
1 Introduction
Any sufficiently expressive specification language contains properties that cannot
be monitored at runtime [2,5,21,23,27,33,35]. For instance, the satisfaction of a
safety property (“bad things never happen”) cannot, in general, be determined
by observing the (finite) behaviour of a program up to the current execution
point; its violation, however, can. Monitorability [13] concerns itself with the
delineation between properties that are monitorable and those that are not.
Monitorability is paramount for a slew of Runtime Verification (RV) tools, such
as those described in [10, 19, 22, 34, 36] (to name but a few), that synthesise
monitors from specifications expressed in a variety of logics. These monitors are
then executed with the system under scrutiny to produce verdicts concerning the
satisfaction or violation of the specifications from which they were synthesised.
Monitorability is crucial for a principled approach because it disciplines the
construction of RV tools. It defines, either explicitly or implicitly, a notion of
monitor correctness, which guides the automated synthesis. It also delimits the
monitorable fragment of the specification logic on which the synthesis is defined:
monitors need not be synthesised for non-monitorable specifications. In some
settings, a syntactic characterisation of monitorable properties can be identi-
fied [1, 5, 27], and used as a core calculus for studying optimisations of the syn-
thesis algorithm. More broadly, monitorability boundaries may guide the design
of hybrid verification strategies, which combine RV with other verification tech-
niques (see the work in [2] for an example of this approach).
In spite of its importance, there is no generally accepted notion of monitora-
bility to date. The literature contains a number of definitions, such as the ones
proposed in [5, 15, 24, 27, 35]. These differ in aspects such as the adopted spec-
ification formalism, e.g., LTL, Street automata, recHML etc., the operational
model, e.g., testers, automata, process calculi etc., and the semantic domain,
e.g., infinite traces, finite and infinite (finfinite) traces or labelled transition sys-
tems. Even after these differences are normalised, many of these definitions are
not in agreement: there are properties that are monitorable according to some
definitions but not monitorable according to others. More alarmingly, as we will
show, frequently cited definitions of monitorability contain serious errors.
This discrepancy between definitions raises the question of which one to
adopt to inform one’s implementation of an RV tool, and what effect this choice
has on the behaviour of the resulting tool. A difficulty in informing this choice
is that few of those definitions make explicit the relationship between the oper-
ational model, i.e., the behaviour of a monitor, and the monitored properties. In
other words, it is not clear what the guarantees provided by the various monitors
mentioned in the literature are, and how they differ from each other.
Example 1. Consider the runtime verification of a system exhibiting (only) three
events over finfinite traces: failure (f), success (s) and recovery (r). One property
we may require is that “failure never occurs and eventually success is reached”,
otherwise expressed in LTL fashion as (G¬f)∧ (F s). According to the definition
of monitorability attributed to Pnueli and Zaks [35] (discussed in Sec. 7), this
property is monitorable. However, it is not monitorable according to others,
including Schneider [38], Viswanathan and Kim [39], and Aceto et al. [5], whose
definition of monitorability coincides with some subset of safety properties. 
Contributions. To our mind, this state of the art is unsatisfactory for tool con-
struction. An RV tool broadly relies on the following ingredients: (i) the input
of the tool in terms of the formalism used to describe the specification proper-
ties; (ii) the executable description of monitors that are the tool’s output and
(iii) the mapping between the inputs and outputs, i.e., the synthesis function of
monitors from specifications. Any account on monitorability should, in our view,
shed light on those three aspects, particularly on what it means for the synthesis
function and the monitors it produces to be correct. In addition, if this account
is flexible enough to incorporate a variety of relationships between specification
properties and the expected behaviour of monitors, it can then be used by the
tool implementors as a principled foundation to guide their design decisions.
For these reasons, we take the view that monitorability comes on a spectrum.
There is a trade-off between the guarantees provided by monitors and the prop-
erties that can be monitored with those guarantees. We argue that considering
different requirements gives rise to a hierarchy of monitorability—depicted in
Fig. 1 (middle)—which classifies properties according to what types of guaran-
tees RV can give for them. At one extreme, anything can be monitored if the
only requirement is for monitors to be sound i.e., they should not contradict the
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Fig. 1. The Monitorability Hierarchy of Regular Properties
monitored specification. However, monitors that are just sound give no guaran-
tees of ever giving a verdict. More usefully, informatively monitorable properties
enjoy monitors that reach a verdict for some finite execution; arguably, this is
the minimum requirement for making monitoring potentially worthwhile. More
stringent requirements can demand this capability to be invariant over moni-
tor executions, i.e., a monitor never reaches a state where it cannot provide a
verdict; then we speak of persistently informative monitors. Adding complete-
ness requirements of different strengths, such as the requirement that a monitor
should be able to identify all failures and/or satisfactions, yields stronger defini-
tions of monitorability: partial, satisfaction or violation complete, and complete.
In order not to favour a specific operational model, the hierarchy in Fig. 1
(middle) is cast in terms of abstract behavioural requirements for monitors. We
then provide an instantiation that concretise those requirements into an opera-
tional hierarchy, establishing operational counterparts for each type of monitora-
bility. To this end, we use the operational framework developed in [5]. We show
this framework to be, in a suitable technical sense, maximally general (Thm. 2).
This shows that our work is equally applicable to other operational models.
In order for a tool to synthesise monitors from specifications, it is useful to
have syntactic characterisations of the properties that are monitorable with the
required guarantees: synthesis can then directly operate on the syntactic frag-
ment. We offer monitorability characterisations as fragments of recHML [6,32]
(a variant of the modal µ-calculus [29]) interpreted over finfinite traces—see
Fig. 1 (right). The logic is expressive enough to capture all regular properties—
the focus of nearly all existing definitions of monitorability—and subsumes more
user-friendly specification logics such as LTL. Partial and complete monitora-
bility already enjoy monitor synthesis functions and neat syntactic characterisa-
tions in recHML [5]; related synthesis functions based on syntactic characteri-
sations for a branching-time setting [26,27] have already been implemented in a
tool [9,10]. Here, we provide the missing syntactic characterisation for informa-
tive monitorability, and for a fragment of persistently informative monitorability.
Finally, we show that the proposed hierarchy accounts for existing notions
of monitorability. See Fig. 1 (left). Safety, co-safety and their union correspond
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to partial monitorability and its two components, satisfaction- and violation-
monitorability; Pnueli and Zaks’s definition of monitorability can be interpre-
tated in two ways, of which one (∃pz) maps to informative monitorability, and
the other (∀pz) to persistently informative monitorability. We also show that the
definitions of monitorability proposed by Falcone et al. [24], contrary to their
claim, do not coincide with safety and co-safety properties. To summarise, our
principal contributions are:
1. A unified operational perspective on existing notions of monitorability, clar-
ifying what operational guarantees each provides, see Thms. 1, 6 and 7;
2. An extension to the syntactic characterisations of monitorable classes from
[5], mapping all but one of these classes to fragments in recHML, which can
be viewed as a target byte-code for higher-level logics, see Thms. 4 and 5.
Proofs omitted from the body of this paper can be found in Appendix C.
2 Preliminaries
Traces. We assume a finite set of actions, a, b, . . .∈Act. The metavariables
t, u∈Actω range over infinite sequences of actions. Finite traces, denoted as
s, r ∈ Act∗, represent finite prefixes of system runs. Collectively, finite and infi-
nite traces Act∞ = Actω∪Act∗ are called finfinite traces. We use f, g ∈ Act∞
(resp., F ⊆ Act∞) to range over finfinite traces (resp., sets of finfinite traces). A
(finfinite) trace with action a at its head is denoted as af . Similarly, a (finfinite)
trace with a prefix s and continuation f is denoted as sf . We write s  f to
denote that the finite trace s is a prefix of f , i.e., ∃g · f = sg.
Properties. A property over finfinite (resp., infinite) traces is a subset of Act∞
(resp., of Actω). Simply property refers to a finfinite property, unless stated
otherwise. We say that a finite trace s positively (resp., negatively) determines
a property P ⊆ Act∞ when sf ∈ P (resp., sf /∈ P ), for every f ∈ Act∞.
The same terms apply similarly when P ⊆ Actω. We call a property regular if
it is the union of a regular finite property Pf∈Act
∗ and an ω-regular infinite
property Pi∈Act
ω.
3 A Monitor-Oriented Hierarchy
From a tool-construction perspective, it is important to give concrete, imple-
mentable definitions of monitors; we do so in Sec. 4. To understand the guar-
antees that these monitors will provide, we first discuss the general notion of
monitor and monitoring system. Already in this general setting, we are able to
identify the various requirements that give rise to the hierarchy of monitorabil-
ity, depicted in the middle part of Fig. 1. Sec. 4 will then provide operational
semantics to this hierarchy, in the setting of regular properties.
We consider a monitor to be an entity that analyses finite traces and (at
the very least) identifies a set of finfinite traces that it accepts and a set of
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finfinite traces that it rejects. We consider two postulates. Firstly, an acceptance
or rejection verdict has to be based on a finite prefix of a trace, Def. 1.1; secondly,
verdicts must be irrevocable, Def. 1.2. These postulates make explicit two features
shared by most monitorability definitions in the literature.
Definition 1. A monitoring system is a triple (M,acc, rej), where M is a
nonempty set of monitors, acc, rej ⊆M×Act∞, and for every m ∈M :
1.
(
acc(m, f) implies ∃s ·
(
s  f and acc(m, s)
) )
and
(
rej(m, f) implies ∃s ·(
s  f and rej(m, s)
) )
;
2.
(
acc(m, s) implies ∀f ·acc(m, sf)
)
and
(
rej(m, s) implies ∀f ·rej(m, sf)
)
. 
Remark 1. Finite automata do not satisfy the requirements of Def. 1 since their
judgement can be revoked. Standard Bu¨chi automata are not good candidates
either, since they need to read the entire infinite trace to accept or reject. 
We define a notion of maximal monitoring system for a collection of proper-
ties; for each property P in that set, such a system must contain a monitor that
reaches a verdict for all traces that have some prefix that determines P .
Definition 2. A monitoring system (M,acc, rej) is maximal for a collection
of properties C ⊆ 2Act
∞
if for every P ∈ C there is a monitor mP ∈ M such
that (i) acc(mP , f) iff trace f has a prefix that positively determines P ; (ii)
rej(mP , f) iff trace f has a prefix that negatively determines P . 
In Sec. 4, we present an instance of such a maximal monitoring system for
regular properties. This shows that, for regular properties at least, the maximal-
ity of a monitoring system is a reasonable requirement. Unless otherwise stated,
we assume a fixed maximal monitoring system (M, acc, rej) throughout the rest
of the paper. For m∈M to monitor for a property P , it needs to satisfy some
requirements. The most important such requirement is soundness.
Definition 3 (Soundness).Monitor m is sound for property P when acc(m, f)
implies f ∈ P , and rej(m, f) implies f /∈ P . 
Lemma 1. If m is sound for P and acc(m, s) (resp., rej(m, s)), then s posi-
tively (resp., negatively) determines P .
Lemma 2. For every P ⊆ Act∞: (i) mP is sound for P ; and (ii) if m is a
sound monitor for P and acc(m, f) (resp., rej(m, f)), then it is also the case
that acc(mP , f)) (resp., rej(mP , f))).
The dual requirement to soundness, i.e., completeness, entails that the moni-
tor detects all violating and satisfying traces. Unfortunately, this is only possible
for trivial properties in the finfinite5 domain—see Prop. 1. Instead, monitors may
be required to accept all satisfying traces, or reject all violating traces.
5 In the infinite domain more properties are completely monitorable, see Sec. 8.
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Definition 4 (Completeness). Monitor m is satisfaction-complete for P if
f∈P implies acc(m, f) and violation-complete for P if f /∈P implies rej(m, f).
It is complete for P if it is both satisfaction- and violation-complete for P and
partially-complete if it is either satisfaction- or violation-complete. 
Proposition 1. If m is sound and complete for P then P=Act∞ or P=∅.
Proof. If ε ∈ P , then acc(m, ε), so from Def. 1, ∀f ∈ Act∞. acc(m, f). Due to
the soundness of m, P = Act∞. Similarly, P = ∅ when ε /∈ P .
We define monitorability in terms of the guarantees that the monitors are ex-
pected to give. Soundness is not negotiable. Given the consequences of requiring
completeness, as evidenced by Prop. 1, we consider weaker forms of completeness.
The weaker the completeness guarantee, the more properties can be monitored.
Definition 5 (Complete Monitorability). Property P is completely moni-
torable when there is a monitor that is sound and complete for P . It is mon-
itorable for satisfactions (resp., violations) when there is a monitor m that is
sound and satisfaction- (resp., and violation-) complete for P . It is partially
monitorable when it is monitorable for satisfactions or violations.
A class of properties C ⊆ 2Act
∞
is satisfaction-, violation-, partially, or
completely monitorable, when every property P∈C is, respectively, satisfaction-,
violation, partially or completely monitorable. We denote the class of all satis-
faction, violation, partially, and completely monitorable properties by maximal
monitoring systems as SCmp, VCmp, PCmp, and Cmp, respectively. 
Since even partial monitorability, the weakest form in Def. 5, renders a sub-
stantial number of properties unmonitorable [5], one may consider even weaker
forms of completeness that only flag a subset of satisfying (or violating) traces.
Sound denotes monitorability without completeness requirements. Arguably, how-
ever, the weakest guarantee for a sound monitor of a property P to be of use is if
it flags at least one trace. One may then further strengthen this requirement and
demand that this guarantee is invariant throughout the analysis of a monitor.
Definition 6 (Informative Monitors6). Monitor m is satisfaction- (resp.,
violation-) informative if ∃f · acc(m, f) (resp., rej(m, f)). It is satisfaction-
(resp., violation-) persistently informative if ∀s∃f ·acc(m, sf) (resp., rej(m, sf)).
We simply say that m is informative (resp., persistently informative) when we
do not distinguish between satisfactions or violations. 
Definition 7 (Informative Monitorability). Property P is informatively (resp.,
persistently informatively) monitorable if there is an informative (resp., a persis-
tently informative) monitor that is sound for P . A class of properties C⊆2Act
∞
is informatively (resp., persistently informatively) monitorable, when all its prop-
erties are informatively (resp., persistently informatively) monitorable. The class
of all informatively (resp., persistently informatively) monitorable properties by
6 These are not related to the informative prefixes from [30] nor persistence from [37]
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maximal monitoring systems is denoted as ICmp (resp., PICmp). A property P
is persistently informatively monitorable for satisfaction (resp., for violation) if
there is a satisfaction- (resp., violation-) persistently informative monitor that
is sound for P . We revisit this definition in Sec. 4. 
Example 2. The property “f never occurs and eventually s is reached” (Exam-
ple 1) is not partially monitorable but is persistently informatively monitorable.
The property requiring that “r only appears a finite number of times” is not
informatively monitorable. For if it were, the respective sound informative moni-
tor m should at least accept or reject one trace. If it accepts a trace f , by Def. 1,
it must accept some prefix s  f . Again, by Def. 1, all continuations, including
srω, must be accepted by m. This makes it unsound, which is a contradiction.
Similarly, if m rejects some f , it must reject some finite s  f that necessarily
contains a finite number of r actions, making it unsound. 
Theorem 1 (Monitorability Hierarchy). The monitorability classes given
in Defs. 5 and 7 form the inclusion hierarchy depicted in Fig. 1.
Proof. The hardest inclusion to show is PCmp = SCmp∪VCmp ⊆ PICmp. Pick
a property P ∈ VCmp. Let s ∈ Act∗. If ∃f · sf /∈ P then by Def. 4 we have
rej(mP , sf). Otherwise, ∀f · sf ∈ P , meaning that s positively determines P ,
and by Def. 2 we have acc(mP , sf). By Def. 6, we deduce thatmP is persistently
informative since ∀s∃f ·acc(mP , sf) or rej(mP , sf)). Thus, by Def. 7, it follows
that P ∈ PICmp. The case for P ∈ SCmp is dual.
4 An Instantiation for Regular Properties
We provide a concrete maximal monitoring system for regular properties . This
monitoring system that gives an operational interpretation to the levels of the
monitorability hierarchy, and enables us to find syntactic characterisations for
them in recHML [5, 32]. Since this logic is a reformulation of the modal µ-
calculus [29], it is expressive enough to describe all regular properties and to
embed specification formalisms such as LTL, (ω-)regular expressions, Bu¨chi au-
tomata, and Street automata, used in the state of the art on monitorability.
The Logic. The syntax or recHML is defined by the grammar in Fig. 2, which
assumes a countable set of logical variables X,Y ∈ LVar. Apart from the stan-
dard constructs for truth, falsehood, conjunction and disjunction, the logic is
equipped with existential (〈a〉ϕ) and universal ([a]ϕ) modal operators, and two
recursion operators expressing least and greatest fixpoints (resp., minX.ϕ and
maxX.ϕ). The semantics is given by the function J−K defined in Fig. 2. It maps
a (possibly open) formula to a set of (finfinite) traces [5] by induction on the
formula structure, using valuations that map logical variables to sets of traces,
σ : LVar→ P(Act∞), where σ(X) is the set of traces assumed to satisfy X . An
existential modality 〈a〉ϕ denotes all traces with a prefix action a and a contin-
uation that satisfies ϕ whereas a universal modality [a]ϕ denotes all traces that
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ϕ,ψ ∈ recHML ::= tt | ff | ϕ∨ψ | ϕ∧ψ
| 〈a〉ϕ | [a]ϕ | minX.ϕ | maxX.ϕ | X
Jtt, σK
def
= Act∞ Jff, σK
def
= ∅
Jϕ1∨ϕ2, σK
def
= Jϕ1, σK ∪ Jϕ2, σK Jϕ1∧ϕ2, σK
def
= Jϕ1, σK ∩ Jϕ2, σK
J[a]ϕ, σK
def
= {f | f = ag implies g ∈ Jϕ, σK} J〈a〉ϕ, σK
def
= {af | f ∈ Jϕ, σK}
JminX.ϕ, σK
def
=
⋂
{F | Jϕ, σ[X 7→ F]K ⊆ F }
JmaxX.ϕ, σK
def
=
⋃
{F | F ⊆ Jϕ, σ[X 7→ F]K } JX,σK
def
= σ(X)
Fig. 2. recHML Syntax and (finfinite) Linear-Time Semantics
are either not prefixed by a or have a continuation g satisfying ϕ. The sets of
traces satisfying the least and greatest fixpoint formulae, minX.ϕ and maxX.ϕ,
are the least and the greatest fixpoints, respectively, of the function induced by
the formula ϕ. For closed formulae, we use JϕK in lieu of Jϕ, σK (for some σ).
Formulae are generally assumed to be closed and guarded [31]. In the discussions
we occasionally treat formulae, ϕ, as the properties they denote, JϕK.
Example 3. The characteristic LTL operators can be encoded in recHML as:
Xϕ
def
=
∨
a∈Act 〈a〉ϕ ϕUψ
def
=minY.
(
ψ ∨ (ϕ∧X Y )
)
Fϕ
def
= ttUϕ
ϕRψ
def
=maxY.
(
(ψ ∧ϕ )∨ (ψ ∧X Y )
)
Gϕ
def
=ff Rϕ
In examples, atomic propositions a and ¬a resp., denote 〈a〉tt and [a]ff. 
For better readability, examples use LTL. Since we operate in the finfinite
domain, X should be read as a strong next operator, in line with Example 3.
The Monitors. We consider the operational monitoring system of [5, 27], sum-
marised in Fig. 3 (symmetric rules for binary operators are omitted). The full
system is given in Appendix B. Monitors are states of a transition system where
m+n denotes an (external) choice and m⊙n denotes a composite monitor where
⊙ ∈ {⊕,⊗}. There are three distinct verdict states, yes, no, and end, although
only the first two are relevant to monitorability. This semantics gives an opera-
tional account of how a monitor in state m incrementally analyses a sequence of
actions s = a1 . . . ak to reach a new state n; the monitorm accepts (resp., rejects)
a trace f , acc(m, f) (resp., rej(m, f)), when it can transition to the verdict state
yes (resp., no) while analysing a prefix s  f . Since verdicts are irrevocable (rule
mVer in Fig. 3), it is not hard to see that this operational framework satis-
fies the conditions for a monitoring system of Def. 1. The monitoring system of
Fig. 3 is also maximal for regular properties, according to Def. 2. This concrete
instance thus demonstrates the realisability of the abstract definitions in Sec. 3.
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m,n ∈Mon ::= v | a.m | m+ n | m⊗n | m⊕n | recx.m | x
v, u ∈ Verd ::= end | no | yes
mAct
a.m
a
−→ m
mVer
v
a
−→ v
mRec
m[recx.m/x]
a
−→ n
recx.m
a
−→ n
mSelL
m
a
−→ m′
m+ n
a
−→ m′
mPar
m
a
−→ m′ n
a
−→ n′
m⊙n
a
−→ m′⊙n′
mTauL
m
τ
−−→ m′
m⊙n
τ
−−→ m′⊙n
mVrE
end⊙end
τ
−−→ end
mVrC1
yes⊗m
τ
−−→ m
mVrC2
no⊗m
τ
−−→ no
mVrD1
no⊕m
τ
−−→ m
mVrD2
yes⊕m
τ
−−→ yes
Fig. 3. Monitor Syntax and Labelled-Transition Semantics
Theorem 2. For all ϕ∈recHML, there is a monitor m∈Mon that is sound for
ϕ and accepts all finite traces that positively determine ϕ and rejects all finite
traces that negatively determine ϕ.
As a corollary of Thm. 2, from Lem. 1 we deduce that for any arbitrary
monitoring system (M, acc, rej), if m ∈ M is sound for some ϕ ∈ recHML,
then there is a monitor n ∈ Mon from Fig. 3 that accepts (resp., rejects) all
traces f that m accepts (resp., rejects). In the sequel, we thus assume that the
fixed monitoring system is (Mon, acc, rej) of Fig. 3, as it subsumes all others.
5 A Syntactic Characterisation of Monitorability
We present syntactic characterizations for the various monitorability classes as
fragments of recHML.
Partial Monitorability, syntactically. In [5] Aceto et al. identify a maximal par-
tially monitorable syntactic fragment of recHML.
Theorem 3 (Partial Monitorability [5]). Consider the fragments:
ϕ, ψ ∈ sHML ::= tt | ff | [a]ϕ | ϕ∧ψ | maxX.ϕ | X and
ϕ, ψ ∈ cHML ::= tt | ff | 〈a〉ϕ | ϕ∨ψ | minX.ϕ | X.
The fragment sHML is monitorable for violation whereas cHML is monitorable
for satisfaction. Furthermore, if ϕ ∈ recHML is monitorable for satisfaction
(resp., for violation) by some m∈Mon, then it is expressible in cHML(resp.,
sHML) , i.e., ∃ψ∈cHML (resp., ψ∈sHML), such that JϕK=JψK.
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As a corollary of Thm. 3, any ϕ ∈ recHML that is monitorable for satis-
faction (resp., for violation) can also be expressed as some ψ ∈ cHML (resp.,
ψ ∈ sHML) where JϕK = JψK. For this fragment, the following automated syn-
thesis function, which is readily implementable, is given in [5].
m(ff)
def
= no m(ϕ1∧ϕ2)
def
= m(ϕ1)⊗m(ϕ2) m(maxX.ϕ)
def
= recx.m(ϕ)
m(tt)
def
= yes m(ϕ1∨ϕ2)
def
= m(ϕ1)⊕m(ϕ2) m(minX.ϕ)
def
= recx.m(ϕ)
m([a]ϕ)
def
= a.m(ϕ) +
∑
b∈Act\{a} b.yes m(X)
def
= x
m(〈a〉ϕ)
def
= a.m(ϕ) +
∑
b∈Act\{a} b.no
Informative Monitorability, syntactically. We proceed to identify syntactic frag-
ments of recHML that correspond to informative monitorability.
Definition 8. The informative fragment is iHML = siHML ∪ ciHML where
siHML = {ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 ∈ recHML | ϕ1 ∈ sHML and ff appears in ϕ1},
ciHML = {ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 ∈ recHML | ϕ1 ∈ cHML and tt appears in ϕ1} 
Theorem 4. For ϕ ∈ recHML, ϕ is informatively monitorable if and only if
there is some ψ ∈ iHML, such that JψK = JϕK.
Example 4. G¬f ∧ F s from Example 2 (expressed here in LTL) is a siHML
property, as G¬f can be written in sHML as maxX.[f]ff∧[s]X∧[r]X . In contrast,
FG¬r cannot be written in iHML, as it is not informatively monitorable. 
Remark 2. In siHML and ciHML, ϕ1 describes an informative part of the for-
mula, that is, a formula with at least one path to tt (or ff), which indicates that
the corresponding finite trace determines the property. Monitor synthesis from
these fragments can use this part of the formula to synthesize a monitor that
detects the finite traces that satisfy (violate) ϕ1. The value of the synthesised
monitor then depends on ϕ1. It is therefore important to have techniques to
extract some ϕ1 that will retain as much monitoring information as possible.
This extraction is outside the scope of this paper and left as future work. 
Persistently Informative Monitorability, syntactically. We also give a syntactic
characterization of the recHML properties that are persistently informatively
monitorable for satisfaction or violation. As the requirements for persistently in-
formative monitors are more subtle than for informative monitors, the fragments
we present are equally more involved than those for informative monitorability.
Definition 9. We define eHML, the explicit fragment of recHML:
ϕ ∈ eHML ::= tt | ff | minX.ϕ | maxX.ϕ | X
| ϕ∨ψ | ϕ∧ψ |
∨
α∈Act
〈α〉ϕα |
∧
α∈Act
[α]ϕα.

Example 5. Formula [f][s]ff is not explicit, but it can be rewritten as the explicit
formula [f]([s]ff ∧ [f]tt ∧ [r]tt) ∧ [s]tt ∧ [r]tt. 
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Roughly, the following definition captures whether tt and ff are reacheable
from subformulae (where the binding of a variable is reachable from the variable).
Definition 10. Given a closed sHML (resp., cHML) formula ϕ, we define for
a subformula ψ that it can refute (resp., verify) in 0 unfoldings, when ff (resp.,
tt) appears in ψ, and that it can refute (resp., verify) in k+1 unfoldings, when it
can refute (resp., verify) in k unfoldings, or X appears in ψ and ψ is in the scope
of a subformula maxX.ψ′ (resp., minX.ψ′) that can refute (resp., verify) in k
unfoldings. We simply say that ψ can refute (resp., verify) when it can refute
(resp., verify) in k unfoldings, for some k ≥ 0. 
Example 6. For formula maxX.[s]X ∧ [f]ff∧ [r]ff, subformula [s]X∧ [f]ff ∧ [r]ff can
refute in 0 unfoldings. In contrast, [s]X cannot refute in 0 unfoldings, but it can
refute in 1, because X appears in it and maxX.[s]X ∧ [f]ff ∧ [r]ff can refute in 0
unfoldings. Therefore, all subformulae of maxX.[s]X ∧ [f]ff ∧ [r]ff can refute. 
We now define the fragments of recHML corresponding to recHML proper-
ties that are persistently informatively monitorable for satisfaction or violation.
Definition 11. We define the fragment pHML = spHML ∪ cpHML where:
spHML =
{
ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 ∈ recHML
∣∣∣ ϕ1 ∈ sHML ∩ eHML and every
subformula of ϕ1 can refute
}
cpHML =
{
ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 ∈ recHML
∣∣∣ ϕ1 ∈ cHML ∩ eHML and every
subformula of ϕ1 can verify
}

Theorem 5. For ϕ ∈ recHML, ϕ is persistently informatively monitorable for
violation (resp., for satisfaction) if and only if there is some ψ ∈ spHML (resp.,
ψ ∈ cpHML), such that JψK = JϕK.
Remark 3. To the best of our efforts, a syntactic characterisation of persistently
informative monitorability would involve pairs of equivalent formulae with parts
from sHML and cHML that together become, in some sense, explicit. We leave
such a characterization as future work. 
6 Safety and Co-safety
The classic (and perhaps the most intuitive) definition of monitorability consists
of (some variation of) safety properties [5, 7, 24, 38, 39]. Nevertheless, there are
subtleties associated with how exactly safety properties are defined—particularly
over the finfinite domain—and how decidable they need to be to qualify as truly
monitorable. For example, Kim and Viswanathan [39] argued that only recur-
sively enumerable safety properties are monitorable (they restrict themselves
to infinite, rather than finfinite traces). By and large, however, most works on
monitorability restrict themselves to regular properties, as we do in Sec. 4.
We adopt the definition of safety that is intuitive for the context of RV:
a property can be considered monitorable if its failures can be identified by a
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finite prefix. This is equivalent to Falcone et al.’s formal definition of safety
properties[24, Def. 4] and work such as [7, 18] when restricted to infinite traces.
Definition 12 (Safety). A property P ⊆ Act∞ is a safety property if every
f /∈ P has a prefix, s that determines P negatively. The class of safety properties
is denoted as Safe in Fig. 1. 
Pnueli and Zaks, and Falcone et al. (among others) argue that it makes sense
to monitor both for violation and satisfaction. Hence, if safety is monitorable for
violations, then the dual class, co-safety (a.k.a. guarantee [24], reachability [17]),
is monitorable for satisfaction. That is, every trace that satisfies a co-safety
property can be positively determined by a finite prefix.
Definition 13 (Co-safety). A property P ⊆ Act∞ is a co-safety property
if every f ∈ P has prefix, s, that determines P positively. The class of safety
properties is denoted as CoSafe, also represented in Fig. 1. 
Example 7. “Eventually s is reached”, i.e., F s, is a co-safety property whereas
“f never occurs”, i.e., G¬f, is a safety property. The property “s occurs infinitely
often”, i.e., GF s, is neither safety nor co-safety. The property only holds over
infinite traces so it cannot be positively determined by a finite trace. Dually,
there is no finite trace that determines that there cannot be an infinite number
of s occurrences in a continuation of the trace. 
Safety and Co-safety, operationally. It should come as no surprise that safety
and co-safety coincide with an equally natural operational definition. Here, we es-
tablish the correspondence with the denotational definition of safety (co-safety),
completing three correspondences amongst the monitorability classes of Fig. 1
Theorem 6. VCmp = Safe and SCmp = CoSafe.
Proof. We treat the case for safety, as the case for co-safety is similar. If P is a
safety property, then for every f ∈ Act∞ \ P , there is some finite prefix s of f
that negatively determines P . Therefore, mP is sound (Lem. 2) and violation-
complete (Def. 2) for P . The other direction follows from Lem. 5.
Aceto et al. [5] already show the correspondence between violation (dually,
satisfaction) monitorability over finfinite traces and properties expressible in
sHML (dually, cHML). As a corollary of Thm. 6, we obtain a syntactic char-
acterisation for the Safe and CoSafe monitorability classes.
Remark 4. Falcone et al. [24, Def. 17, Thm. 3] propose definitions of monitorabil-
ity over finfinite traces that are claimed to coincide with the classes Safe, CoSafe
and their union. However, this claim is incorrect. The properties, “the trace is
finite” and GF s from Example 7 are neither safety nor co-safety properties. On
the other hand, they are monitorable according to the alternative monitorabil-
ity definition given in [24, Def. 17]. If the results claimed in [24, Thm. 3] held
true, this would contradict the fact that those properties are neither safety nor
co-safety properties. See Appendix A for further details. 
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7 Pnueli and Zaks
The work on monitorability due to Pnueli and Zaks [35] is often cited by the RV
community [13]. The often overlooked particularity of their definitions is that
they only define monitorability of a property with respect to a (finite) sequence.
Definition 14 ([35]). Property P is s-monitorable, where s ∈ Act∗, if there is
some r ∈ Act∗ such that P is positively or negatively determined by sr. 
Example 8. The property
(
f ∧ F r
)
∨
(
FG s
)
is s-monitorable for any finite trace
that begins with f, i.e., fs, since it is determined by the extension fsr. It is not
s-monitorable for finite traces that begin with an action other than f. 
Monitorability over properties—rather than over property–sequence pairs—
can then be defined by either quantifying universally or existentially over finite
traces: a property is monitorable either if it is s-monitorable for all s, or for
some s. We address both definitions, which we call ∀pz- and ∃pz-monitorability
respectively. ∀pz-monitorability is the more standard interpretation: it appears
for example in [14, 24] where it is attributed to Pnueli and Zaks. However, the
original intent seems to align more with ∃pz-monitorability: in [35], Pnueli and
Zaks refer to a property as non-monitorable if it is not monitorable for any
sequence. This interpretation coincides with weak monitorability used in [20].
Definition 15 (∀pz-monitorability). A property P is (universally Pnueli–
Zaks) ∀pz-monitorable if it is s-monitorable for all finite traces s. The class of
all ∀pz-monitorable properties is denoted ∀PZ. 
Definition 16 (∃pz-monitorability). A property is (existentially Pnueli–Zaks)
∃pz-monitorable if it is s-monitorable for some finite trace s, i.e., if it is ε-
monitorable. The class of ∃pz-monitorable properties is written ∃PZ. 
The apparently innocuous choice between existential and universal quantifi-
cation leads to different monitorability classes ∀PZ and ∃PZ.
Example 9. Consider the property “Either s occurs before f, or r happens in-
finitely often”, expressed in LTL fashion as
(
(¬f)U s
)
∨
(
GF r
)
. This property is
∃pz-monitorable because every finite trace sf positively determines the property.
However, it is not ∀pz-monitorable because no extension of the trace f positively
or negatively determines that property. Indeed, all extensions of f violate the first
disjunct and, as we argued in Example 7, there is no finite trace that determines
the second conjunct positively or negatively. 
From Defs. 15 and 16, it follows immediately that ∀PZ ⊂ ∃PZ.
Proposition 2. All properties in Safe ∪ CoSafe are ∀pz-monitorable.
Proof. Let P ∈ Safe and pick a finite trace s. If there is an f such that sf /∈ P
then, by Def. 12, there exists r  sf that negatively determines P , meaning that
s has an extension that negatively determines P . Alternatively, if there is no f
such that sf /∈ P , s itself positively determines P . Hence P is s-monitorable, for
every s, according to Def. 14. The case for P ∈ CoSafe is dual.
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Pnueli and Zaks, operationally. ∃pz-monitorability coincides with informative
monitorability: ∃pz-monitorable properties are those for which some monitor
can reach a verdict on some finite trace. For similar reasons, ∀pz-monitorability
coincides with persistently informative monitorability. See Fig. 1.
Theorem 7. ∃PZ = ICmp and ∀PZ = PICmp.
Proof. Since the proofs of the two claims are analogous, we simply outline the
one for ∀PZ = PICmp. Let P ∈ ∀PZ and pick a finite trace s ∈ Act∗. By Lem. 2,
mP is sound for P . By Def. 6 we need to show that there exists an f such that
acc(mP , sf) or rej(mP , sf). From Defs. 14 and 15 we know that there is a finite
r such that sr positively or negatively determines P . By Def. 2 we know that
acc(mP , sr) or rej(mP , sr). Thus P ∈ PICmp, which is the required result.
Conversely, assume P ∈ PICmp, and pick a s ∈ Act∗. By Defs. 14 and 15,
we need to show that there is an extension of s that positively or negatively
determines P . From Defs. 6 and 7, there exists a f such that acc(mP , sf) or
rej(mP , sf). By Def. 1, there is a finite extension of s, say sr, that is a prefix
of sf such that acc(mP , sr) or rej(mP , sr). By Def. 2, we know that sr either
positively or negatively determines P . Thus P ∈ ∀PZ.
8 Monitorability in other settings
We have shown how classical definitions of monitorability fit into our hierarchy
and provided the corresponding operational interpretations and syntactic char-
acterisations, focussing on regular finfinite properties over a finite alphabet and
monitors with irrevocable verdicts. Here we discuss how different parameters,
both within our setting and beyond, affect what is monitorable.
Monitorability with respect to the alphabet. The monitorability of a property
can depend on Act. For instance, if Act has at least two elements {a, b, . . .},
property {aω}, which can be represented as max X.〈a〉X , is s-monitorable for
every sequence s, as s can be extended to sb, which negatively determines the
property. On the other hand, assume that Act = {a}. In this case, {aω} is
neither ∃pz- nor ∀pz-monitorable. Indeed, no string s = ak, k ≥ 0, determines
{aω} positively or negatively as s does not satisfy p but its extension aω does.
On the other hand, when restricted to infinite traces, p is again ∃pz-monitorable.
So far, we only considered finite alphabets; how an infinite alphabet, which
may encode integer data for example, affects monitorability is left as future work.
Monitoring with revocable verdicts. Early on, we postulated that verdicts are ir-
revocable. Although this is a typical (implicit) assumption in most work on moni-
torability, some authors have considered monitors that give revocable judgements
when an irrevocable one is not appropriate. This approach is taken by Bauer et al.
when they define a finite-trace semantics for LTL, called RV-LTL [14]. Falcone
et al. [24] also have a definition of monitorability based on this idea (in addition to
those discussed in Remark 4). It uses the four-valued domain {yes, no, yesc, noc}
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(c for currently). Finite traces that do not determine a property yield a (revoca-
ble) verdict yesc or noc that indicates whether the trace observed so far satisfies
the property; yes and no are still irrevocable. This definition allows all finfinite
properties to be monitored since it does not require verdicts to be irrevocable.
This type of monitoring does not give any guarantees beyond soundness:
there are properties that are monitorable according to this definition for which
no sound monitor ever reaches an irrevocable verdict: F G s for the system from
Example 1 has no sound informative monitor, yet can be monitored according to
Falcone et al.’s four-valued monitoring. This type of monitorability is complete,
in the sense of providing at least a revocable verdict for all traces.
Monitorability in the infinite and finite. Bauer et al. use ∀pz-monitorability in
their study of runtime verification for LTL [16] and attribute it to Pnueli and
Zaks. However, unlike Falcone et al., Pnueli and Zaks [35] and ourselves, they
focus on properties over infinite traces. There are some striking differences that
arise if there is no risk of an execution ending. Aceto et al. show that, unlike in the
finfinite domain, a set of non-trivial properties becomes completely monitorable:
HML [28] (a.k.a. modal logic) is both satisfaction- and violation-monitorable
over infinite traces [5]. Furthermore, some properties, like {aω} over Act = {a},
that were not ∃pz- or ∀pz-monitorable on the finfinite domain, are ∃pz- or even
∀pz-monitorable on the infinite domain. The full analysis of how the hierarchy
in Fig. 1 changes for the infinite domain is left for future work.
Barringer et al. [12] consider monitoring of properties over finite traces. In
this domain, all properties are monitorable if, as is the case in [12], the end of a
trace is observable; in this setting the question of monitorability is less relevant.
9 Conclusion
We have proposed a unified, operational view on monitorability. This allows
us to clearly state the implicit operational guarantees of existing definitions
of monitorability. For instance, recall Example 1 from the introduction: since
(G¬f) ∧ (F s) is ∃pz- and ∀pz-monitorable but it is not a safety nor co-safety
property, we know there is a monitor which can recognise some violations and
satisfactions of this property, but there is no monitor that can recognise all
satisfactions nor all violations.
Although we focussed on the setting of regular, finfinite properties, the def-
initions of monitorability in Sec. 3, and, more fundamentally, the methodology
that systematically puts the relationship between monitor behaviour and spec-
ification centre stage, are equally applicable to other settings. We have already
mentioned the infinite domain and richer alphabets in Sec. 8. Another interest-
ing direction would be to lift the restriction to regular properties and finite-state
monitors. Indeed, while Barringer et al. consider a specification logic that allows
for context-free properties [12], in [25], Ferrier et al. consider monitors with regis-
ters (i.e., infinite state monitors) to verify safety properties that are not regular.
It seems likely that monitorability beyond safety may also be worth studying in
these extended settings.
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Appendix A discusses in more details Falcone et al.’s claim that their defini-
tions of monitorability coincide with safety and co-safety properties and provides
counter-examples showing this to be incorrect. Appendix B gives further tech-
nical details regarding the monitoring system presented in Sec. 4. Appendix C
contains all the omitted proofs.
A Monitorability a` la Falcone et al.
Falcone et al. [24] propose three definitions of monitorability (Definitions 16 and
17 in [24]) which they claim to coincide with safety, co-safety, and the union
of safety and co-safety properties (Theorem 3 in [24]). We discuss this claim in
more detail here, and argue that it does not hold. In brief, their definition deems
all properties that are uniform over finite traces, such as “success infinitely
often”, or “the trace is finite” to be monitorable, not just safety and co-safety
properties. In this appendix we recall Falcone et al.’s definitions and show that
their definitions of monitorability include more than just safety and co-safety
properties.
Remark 5. Falcone et al. present finfinite properties as a pair consisting of a set
of finite traces and a set of infinite traces. Here we will speak of just one set,
containing both finite and infinite traces.
The definition of monitorability proposed by Falcone et al. in [24] is param-
eterised by a truth domain, and a mapping of formulas into this domain. They
then give a uniform condition that defines monitorability with respect to any
truth-domain and its associated mapping. Here we focus on their monitorability
with respect to the truth-domains {tt, ?}, {ff, ?} and {tt,ff, ?}, which they claim
correspond to co-safety, safety and their union, respectively.
Definition 17 (Property evaluation with respect to a truth-domain [24]).
For each of three different verdict-domains and finfinite properties P (“r-properties”
in their terminology), Falcone, Fernandez and Mournier define the following
evaluation functions:
For B = {ff, ?} and s ∈ Act∗:
JP KB(s) = ff if ∀f ∈ Act
∞. sf /∈ P
JP KB(s) =? otherwise.
For B = {tt, ?} and s ∈ Act∗:
JP KB(s) = tt if ∀f ∈ Act
∞. sf ∈ P
JP KB(s) =? otherwise.
For B = {tt,ff, ?} and s ∈ Act∗:
JP KB(s) = tt if s ∈ P and ∀f ∈ Act
∞. sf ∈ P
JP KB(s) = ff if s /∈ P and ∀f ∈ Act
∞. sf /∈ P
JP KB(s) =? otherwise. 
Definition 18 (FFM-monitorability Definition 17, [24]). A property P is
B-monitorable over a truth domain B if for all s, r ∈ Act∗, if s ∈ P and r /∈ P ,
then JP KB(s) 6= JP KB(r). 
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From this definition, it easily follows that any property P for which P ∩
Act
∗ = ∅ or Act∗ ⊆ P is vacuously monitorable for any truth-domain, and
evaluation function. However, not all such properties are safety or co-safety
properties: “always eventually success” for instance is neither a safety nor a
co-safety property.
We believe the critical points are Lemma 3 and Theorem 3 in [24], which do
not hold. The proof of Lemma 3 in particular (Appendix 2.3) falsely claims that
P ∩Act∗ = ∅ or Act∗ ⊆ P implies that P is a safety or co-safety properties.
B An Operational Monitoring System: Regular Monitors
The monitoring system (Mon, acc, rej) is given by a Labelled Transition System
(LTS) based on Act, which is comprised of the monitor states, or monitors,
and a transition relation. The set of monitor states, Mon, and the monitor
transition relation, −→⊆ (Mon × (Act ∪ {τ}) ×Mon), are defined in Fig. 3.
The suggestive notation m
µ
−−→ n denotes (m,µ, n) ∈−→; we also write m 6
µ
−−→
to denote ¬(∃n. m
µ
−−→ n). We employ the usual notation for weak transitions
and write m =⇒ n in lieu of m(
τ
−→)∗n and m
µ
=⇒ n for m =⇒ ·
µ
−−→ · =⇒ n. We
write sequences of transitions m
α1=⇒ · · ·
αk=⇒ n as m
s
=⇒ n, where s = α1 · · ·αk. A
monitor that does not use any parallel operator is called a regular monitor. The
full monitoring system and regular monitors were defined and used in [1, 5, 27].
Definition 19 (Acceptance and Rejection). For a monitor m ∈ Mon, we
define rej(m, s) (resp., acc(m, s)) and say that m rejects (resp., accepts) when
m
s
=⇒ no (resp., m
s
=⇒ yes). Similarly, for t ∈ Actω, we write rej(m, t) (resp.,
acc(m, t)) if there exist s ∈ Act∗ and u ∈ Actω such that t = su and m rejects
(resp., accepts) s. 
For a finite nonempty set of indices I, we use
∑
i∈I mi to denote any com-
bination of the monitors in {mi | i ∈ I} using the operator +. For each j ∈ I,∑
i∈I mi is called a sum of mj , and mj is called a summand of
∑
i∈I mi. The
following Lem. 3 assures us that regular monitors satisfy the conditions to be a
monitoring system, given in Def. 1.
Lemma 3 (Verdict Persistence, [5, 27]). v
s
=⇒ m implies m = v.
We will use the following definitions and results in the proofs of Appendix C.
We define determinism for regular monitors.
Definition 20 ([3, 4]). A closed regular monitor m is deterministic iff every
sum of at least two summands that appears in m is of the form
∑
α∈A α.mα,
where A ⊆ Act. 
Definition 21 (Verdict Equivalence). Monitors m and n are called verdict
equivalent when for every f ∈ Act∞, acc(m, f) iff acc(n, f) and rej(m, f) iff
rej(n, f). 
20
Theorem 8 ([4, 5]). Every monitor in Mon is verdict equivalent to a deter-
ministic regular monitor.
In the following, we say that P is suffix-closed when for all s, r ∈ Act∗,
s ∈ P implies sr ∈ P — notice that we only quantify over finite traces. The
suffix-closure of P is {sf ∈ Act∞ | s ∈ P}.
Theorem 9 ([3,4]). If L,L′ ⊆ Act∗ are regular and suffix-closed, and L∩L′ =
∅, then there is a regular monitor m, such that acc(m, s) iff s ∈ L and rej(m, s)
iff s ∈ L′.
In this appendix, we use the formula synthesis function from regular monitors
to sHML formulae, from [5, 27]:
f(no) = ff f(end) = f(yes) = tt f(x) = X
f(m+ n) = f(m)∧f(n) f(a.m) = [a]f(m) f(recX.m) = maxX.f(m)
Theorem 10 ([5]). For every regular monitor m, f(m) ∈ sHML, and m is
sound and violation-complete for f(m).
C Proofs Omitted from the Main Document
Here we present the proofs of results that were omitted from the main text.
We use the following classical result (see [8] for more on the µ-calculus and
recHML):
Lemma 4. If ϕ ∈ recHML, then JϕK ∩Act∗ is regular.
Due to Thm. 8, we can assume that every monitor in Mon is a regular, or
deterministic regular monitor. We often do so in the following proofs.
Definition 22. Let P ⊆ Act∞. We define the following two sets of finite traces:
D−P = {s ∈ Act
∗ | P is negatively determined by s};
D+P = {s ∈ Act
∗ | P is positively determined by s}. 
Lemma 5. If P ⊆ Act∞ is monitorable for satisfaction (resp., for violation)
by any monitoring system, then every f ∈ P (resp., f ∈ Act∞ \ P ) has a finite
prefix that positively (resp., negatively) determines P .
Proof. We treat the case for satisfaction, as the case for violation is dual. Let f ∈
P and m be a monitor that is sound and satisfaction-complete for P . Then, due
to satisfaction-completeness, acc(m, f), and by the requirements of Def. 1, there
is a finite prefix s of f , such that acc(m, s). Therefore, by the same requirements,
for every g ∈ Act∞, acc(m, sg). As we know that m is sound for P , this yields
that s positively determines P .
For a set of finite traces S ⊆ Act∗, we define
minS = {s ∈ S | ∀r ∈ S. (r is a prefix of s⇒ s = r)}.
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Lemma 6. Assume that every finfinite trace that satisfies (resp., violates) P has
a prefix that positively (resp., negatively) determines P . Then P (resp., Act∞ \
P ) is the suffix-closure of min(P ∩Act∗) (resp., of min((Act∞ \ P ) ∩Act∗)).
Proof. Again, we only treat the case for satisfaction. Let f ∈ P . By our assump-
tions, there is at least one finite prefix of f that positively determines P . These
prefixes of f are well-ordered by the prefix relation, and therefore there is a small-
est prefix s of f that positively determines P . Therefore, s ∈ min(P ∩ Act∗),
and we see that f is in the suffix-closure of min(P ∩ Act∗). Conversely, let
s ∈ min(P ∩Act∗) and f be an extension of s. Then, s ∈ JP K, so by the proviso
of the lemma, there is a prefix r of s (and of f) that positively determines P ,7
and therefore f ∈ P .
Proofs Omitted from Sec. 4: Regularity and Monitors
Lemma 7. If ϕ ∈ recHML, then D+ϕ and D
−
ϕ are regular.
Proof. We know that JϕK∩Act∗ is regular (Lem. 4) and JϕK∩Actω, the infinite-
trace interpretation of ϕ, is ω-regular. Therefore, there are a DFA DF that
recognizes JϕK∩Act∗ and a deterministic ω-automatonDI that recognizes JϕK∩
Act
ω. Let AF = {s ∈ Act
∗ | ∀r ∈ Act∗. sr ∈ JϕK} and AI = {s ∈ Act
∗ |
∀t ∈ Actω. st ∈ JϕK}. Let QF (resp., QI) be the set of states in DF (resp.,
in DI) that can be reached reading some trace s ∈ Act
∗. By construction, for
each s ∈ Act∗, we have that s ∈ AF (resp., s ∈ AI) if and only if s ends in
the respective set in the automaton. Therefore, there are DFAs D′F and D
′
I for
AF and AI , respectively, and thus D
+
ϕ = AF ∩AI is regular. The case for D
−
ϕ is
similar.
Theorem 2 For all ϕ∈recHML, there is a monitor m∈Mon that is sound for
ϕ and accepts all finite traces that positively determine ϕ and rejects all finite
traces that negatively determine ϕ.
Proof. By Lem. 7, D+ϕ and D
−
ϕ , the sets of finite traces that (respectively) posi-
tively or negatively determine ϕ are regular. It is also not hard to see that they
are suffix-closed. Therefore the theorem follows from Thm. 9.
Corollary 1. If m is a sound monitor for ϕ ∈ recHML, then there is a regular
monitor n that is sound for ϕ, and such that for every s ∈ Act∗, acc(m, s)
implies acc(n, s), and rej(m, s) implies rej(n, s).
Proof. By Thm. 2, there is a regular monitor n that is sound for ϕ, and accepts
all finite traces that positively determine ϕ, and rejects all the finite traces that
negatively determine ϕ. If acc(m, s) (resp., rej(m, s)) for some finite trace s,
then, due to the soundness of m, s ∈ JϕK (resp., s /∈ JϕK), and therefore, from
Lem. 1, s positively (resp., negatively) determines ϕ. By the properties of n, we
have that acc(n, s) (resp., rej(n, s)).
7 The reader may also notice that s = r, due to the minimality of s.
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Proofs Omitted from Sec. 5: Syntactic Characterizations
Definition 23. Let m be a closed regular monitor, and let n be one of its sub-
monitors. We say that n can refute (resp., verify) in 0 unfoldings, when no (resp.,
yes) appears in n, and that it can refute (resp., verify) in k+1 unfoldings, when
it can refute (resp., verify) in k unfoldings, or x appears in n and n is in the
scope of a submonitor recx.n′ of m that can refute (resp., verify) in k unfoldings.
We simply say that n can refute (resp., verify) in m when it can refute (resp.,
verify) in k unfoldings, for some k ≥ 0. 
We define the depth of ff in an sHML formula in a recursive way: dff(ff) = 0;
dff(tt) = dff(X) = ∞; dff(ψ1 ∧ ψ2) = min{dff(ψ1), dff(ψ2)} + 1; dff([α]ψ) =
dff(ψ) + 1; and dff(maxX.ψ) = dff(ψ) + 1.
Lemma 8. For all possibly open ϕ, ψ ∈ sHML dff(ϕ[ψ/X ]) ≤ dff(ϕ).
Proof. Straightforward induction on ϕ.
Lemma 9. If ϕ ∈ iHML, then there is a regular monitor that is sound and
informative for ϕ.
Proof. We assume that ϕ ∈ siHML, as the case for ϕ ∈ ciHML is similar. Let
ϕ = ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2, where ϕ1 ∈ sHML and ff appears in ϕ1. We prove by induction
on dff(ψ) that for all ψ ∈ sHML, if dff(ψ) < ∞, then there is a finite trace
that negatively determines ψ. If dff(ψ) = 0, then ψ = ff, and we are done, as ε
negatively determines ff. Otherwise, dff(ψ) = k+1 and we consider the following
cases:
ψ = ψ1 ∧ ψ2 In this case, either dff(ψ1) = k or dff(ψ2) = k, so by the inductive
hypothesis, there is a finite trace that negatively determines one of the two
conjuncts, and therefore also ψ.
ψ = [α]ψ′ In this case, dff(ψ
′) = k, so, by the inductive hypothesis, there is a
finite trace s that negatively determines ψ′, so αs negatively determines ψ.
ψ = maxX.ψ′ In this case, dff(ψ
′) = k. Therefore, from Lem. 8, dff(ψ
′[ψ/X ]) ≤
dff(ψ
′) = k, so, by the inductive hypothesis, there is a finite trace s that
negatively determines ψ′[ψ/X ], so it also negatively determines ψ, because
Jψ′[ψ/X ]K = JψK.
As ff appears in ϕ1, dff(ϕ) <∞, so there is a finite trace that negatively deter-
mines ϕ1, and therefore also ϕ. The theorem follows from Thm. 2.
Lemma 10. If ϕ ∈ recHML and there is a monitor that is sound and infor-
mative for ϕ, then there is some ψ ∈ iHML such that JψK = JϕK.
Proof. If m is sound and informative for ϕ, then by Lem. 1, there is a finite
trace s that positively or negatively determines ϕ. Without loss of generality, we
assume that s positively determines ϕ. We can then easily construct a formula
ψ1(s) that is satisfied exactly by s and all its extensions, recursively on s: let
ψ1(ε) = tt, and let ψ1(αs) = 〈α〉ψ1(s). Then, let ψ = ψ1(s)∨ϕ. Thus, ψ ∈ iHML
and JψK = JϕK.
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Theorem 4 For ϕ ∈ recHML, ϕ is informatively monitorable if and only if
there is some ψ ∈ iHML, such that JψK = JϕK.
Proof. A consequence of Lems. 9 and 10.
Lemma 11. If maxX.ϕ ∈ sHML can refute in maxX.ϕ ∈ sHML, then it is
also the case that ϕ[maxX.ϕ/X ] can refute in ϕ[maxX.ϕ/X ].
Lemma 12. If all subformulae of [α]ϕ or ϕ ∧ ψ or ψ ∧ ϕ can refute, then all
subformulae of ϕ can refute. If all subformulae of maxX.ϕ can refute, then all
subformulae of ϕ[maxX.ϕ/X ] can refute.
We define the box-depth of a formula from eHML ∩ sHML recursively:
dB

 ∧
γ∈Act
[γ]ϕγ

 = dB(ff) = 0
dB(X) = dB(tt) = ∞
dB(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2) = min{dB(ϕ1), dB(ϕ2)}+ 1; and
dB(maxX.ϕ
′) = dB(ϕ
′) + 1.
Lemma 13. For all possibly open ϕ, ψ ∈ eHML∩sHML dB(ϕ[ψ/X ]) ≤ dB(ϕ).
Proof. Straightforward induction on ϕ.
Lemma 14. Let α ∈ Act and ϕ ∈ eHML ∩ sHML (resp., ϕ ∈ eHML ∩
cHML), where all subformulae of ϕ can refute (resp., verify). There is some
ψ ∈ eHML ∩ sHML (resp., ψ ∈ eHML ∩ cHML), such that all subformulae
of ψ can refute (resp., verify), and for every f ∈ Act∞, αf ∈ JϕK implies that
f ∈ JψK (resp., f ∈ JψK implies that αf ∈ JϕK).
Proof. We assume that ϕ ∈ eHML∩sHML, as the case for ϕ ∈ eHML∩cHML
is similar. Since ϕ is a closed formula and can refute, ff appears in ϕ, and therefore
dB(ϕ) < ∞. We proceed to prove the lemma by induction on dB(ϕ), similarly
to the proof of Lem. 9.
If ϕ = ff, then we are done immediately by taking ψ = ff.
If ϕ =
∧
γ∈Act [γ]ϕγ , then we can set ψ = ϕα.
If ϕ = ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2, then either da(ϕ1) < ∞ or da(ϕ2) < ∞, and we are done by
the inductive hypothesis on one of the two subformulae.
If ϕ = maxX.ϕ′, then ϕ′[ϕ/X ] ∈ eHML∩sHML and all subformulae of ϕ′[ϕ/X ]
can refute, by Lem. 12. Furthermore, JϕK = Jϕ′[ϕ/X ]K, and we are done by
the inductive hypothesis.
Lemma 15. If ϕ ∈ spHML or ϕ ∈ cpHML, then there is a regular moni-
tor that is sound for ϕ and persistently rejecting, or, respectively, persistently
verifying.
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Proof. We assume that ϕ ∈ spHML, as the case for ϕ ∈ cpHML is similar.
Let ϕ = ψ ∧ ψ∗, where ψ ∈ eHML ∩ sHML and all of its subformulae can
refute. By Thm. 2, it suffices to prove that for every s ∈ Act∗, there is some
r ∈ Act∗, such that sr negatively determines ϕ. We prove this by induction on
s. If s = ε, then as in the proof of Lem. 9, we can show that there is a finite
trace that negatively determines ψ. If s = as′, then by Lem. 14. there is some
ψ′ ∈ eHML ∩ sHML, such that all subformulae of ψ′ can refute, and for every
f ∈ Act∞, af ∈ JψK implies that f ∈ Jψ′K. By the inductive hypothesis, there
is some r, such that s′r negatively determines ψ′, and therefore, sr negatively
determines ψ.
We define the depth of a variable x in a regular monitor m recursively:
dx(x) = 0 and dx(y) = d(no) = d(yes) = ∞, where y 6= x; dx(m1 + m2) =
min{dx(m1), dx(m2)}+1; dx(α.m) = dx(m)+1; and dx(rec x. m) = dx(rec y. m) =
dx(m) + 1.
Lemma 16. Let m be a persistently rejecting, deterministic regular monitor. If
A ( Act, then
∑
α∈A α.mα can only appear in m as a submonitor of a larger
sum.
Proof. Let a ∈ Act \ A and let m′ be an open monitor and x a variable
that does not appear in m, such that m = m′[
∑
α∈A α.mα/x]. It is clear that∑
α∈A α.mα 6
a
=⇒. Therefore, it suffices to prove that for every deterministic n
with free variable x, if n′ 6
a
=⇒, then there is a finite trace s, such that there is
no regular monitor o for which n[n′/x]
sa
==⇒ o. We proceed to prove this claim
by induction on dx(n), and the case for n = x is immediate. If n = n1 + n2,
then, as n is deterministic, n = b.n′1+ c.n
′
2, where b 6= c, and we are done by the
inductive hypothesis on either n′1 or n
′
2, and n
′. If n = b.n1, then if the inductive
hypothesis on n′1 and n
′ gives trace r, then we can set s = br. If n = rec y.n1,
then we re done by the inductive hypothesis on n1[n/y] and n
′[n/y].
Here we call a regular monitor explicit when it is generated by the grammar:
m ::= end | no | x |
∑
α∈Act
α.mα | recx.m.
Corollary 2. Every persistently rejecting, deterministic regular monitor is ex-
plicit.
Proof. From Lem. 16.
Lemma 17. Let m be an explicit deterministic regular monitor, such that all of
its submonitors can refute. Then, f(m) ∈ eHML and all of its subformulae can
refute.
Proof. By induction on the construction of m.
Lemma 18. If ϕ ∈ recHML and there is a monitor that is sound for ϕ and
persistently rejecting or persistently verifying, then there is some ψ ∈ spHML,
or, respectively, ψ ∈ cpHML, such that JψK = JϕK.
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Proof. We treat the case where the monitor is persistently rejecting, as the case
for a persistently verifying monitor is similar. From Cor. 1, there is a regular
monitor, m, that is sound for ϕ and persistently rejecting. By Thm. 8, we can
assume that m is deterministic (Def. 20). From Cor. 2, m is explicit. If there is
a submonitor of m that cannot refute, then we can inductively on m prove that
there is a finite trace s, for which there is no finite trace r, such that m
sr
==⇒ no,
which is a contradiction. Therefore, from Lem. 17, the sHML formula f(m) that
we can synthesize from m is in eHML, and all of its subformulae can refute.
Since m is sound for ϕ and sound and violation complete for f(m), it is the
case that Act∞ \ Jf(m)K ⊆ Act∞ \ JϕK, and therefore f(m) ∧ ϕ ∈ spHML and
Jf(m) ∧ ϕK = JϕK.
Theorem 5 For ϕ ∈ recHML, ϕ is persistently informatively monitorable for
violation (resp., for satisfaction) if and only if there is some ψ ∈ spHML (resp.,
ψ ∈ cpHML), such that JψK = JϕK.
Proof. A consequence of Lems. 15 and 18.
26
